Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

  title={Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics},
  author={Gene m. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman},
  journal={Public Choice \& Political Economy eJournal},
  • G. Grossman, E. Helpman
  • Published 1 October 1994
  • Political Science, Economics
  • Public Choice & Political Economy eJournal
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament. The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological. The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions. In this context, we ask: How do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties? We show that each party is induced to behave as if it… Expand
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