Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

@article{Ferraz2009ElectoralAA,
  title={Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments},
  author={Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Shimizu Finan},
  journal={NBER Working Paper Series},
  year={2009}
}
  • C. FerrazF. Finan
  • Published 1 April 2009
  • Political Science, Economics
  • NBER Working Paper Series
Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These… 

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