Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources

@article{McKelvey1985ElectionsWL,
  title={Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources},
  author={Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  year={1985},
  volume={36},
  pages={55-85}
}

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Sequential elections with limited information

We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates

Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model

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