Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes

  title={Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes},
  author={Michael K. Miller},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={691 - 727}
  • Michael K. Miller
  • Published 1 May 2015
  • Political Science, Economics
  • Comparative Political Studies
The responsiveness of policy to election results is a central component of democracy. Do the outcomes of autocratic elections also affect policy choice? Even when the threat of turnover is low, I argue that autocratic elections influence policy by allowing citizens to signal dissatisfaction with the regime. Supplementing existing work, this study explains how this opposition is communicated credibly and then shows that ruling parties use this information to calibrate policy concessions. In the… 

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