Electing Popes: Approval Balloting and Qualified-Majority Rule

@article{Colomer1998ElectingPA,
  title={Electing Popes: Approval Balloting and Qualified-Majority Rule},
  author={Josep M. Colomer and Iain McLean},
  journal={Journal of Interdisciplinary History},
  year={1998},
  volume={29},
  pages={1-22}
}
  • J. Colomer, I. McLean
  • Published 1 July 1998
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Interdisciplinary History
L'A. retrace l'histoire du mode de designation du Pape dans l'Eglise. L'un des enjeux dans cette institution a ete de preserver l'autonomie de l'Eglise catholique face au pouvoir temporel. Les relations entre Pape et empereur romain sont etudiees la pour le souligner. L'A. montre pourquoi l'election papale a longtemps repose sur le principe de l'unanimite : il en montre aussi toutes les limites. Il explique ainsi comment le conclave s'est mis en place, pourquoi on y a instaure la regle de la… 
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Highly Influential Citations
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64 Citations

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