Electing Directors

@article{Cai2008ElectingD,
  title={Electing Directors},
  author={Jie Cai and Jacqueline L. Garner and Ralph A. Walkling},
  journal={Corporate Finance: Governance},
  year={2008}
}
Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendation, have little economic impact on shareholder votes. Even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower 'abnormal' CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing… Expand
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