Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia

  title={Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia},
  author={Kate Baldwin},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1925 - 1956}
  • Kate Baldwin
  • Published 1 October 2019
  • Economics
  • Comparative Political Studies
What types of leaders are effective in organizing public goods that require community contributions? In many settings, both citizens and state agencies provide financing, labor, and oversight of local projects. This article analyzes the effects of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and hereditary chiefs in facilitating co-produced public goods in Zambia. MPs have electoral motivations to provide public goods but may not be well-positioned to organize community contributions. Chiefs lack… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Electoral Consequences of Colonial Invention: Brokers, Chiefs, and Distribution in Northern Ghana

abstract:This article studies the effects of traditional chiefs—a common type of broker—on voters' ability to extract state resources from politicians. Using original data from Northern Ghana, the

Is political engagement by constitutional monarchs compatible with democracy?

  • Kana Inata
  • Political Science
    Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
  • 2021
Constitutional monarchies have proved to be resilient, and some have made substantive political interventions even though their positions are mostly hereditary, without granted constitutional

Co-Financing Community-Driven Development Through Informal Taxation: Experimental Evidence from South-Central Somalia

Community contributions are often required as part of community-driven development (CDD) programmes, with payment encouraged through matching grants. However, little remains known about the impact of

Traditional Political Institutions and Democracy: Reassessing Their Compatibility and Accountability

This article revisits prominent frameworks for understanding traditional political institutions which make pessimistic assessments about their compatibility with democracy. Traditional political

Traditional authority and bargaining for legitimacy in dual legitimacy systems

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the quest for legitimacy conducted by hereditary, traditional leaders in dual legitimacy systems. We theorise that traditional leaders engage in meta-constitutional

Explaining the Constitutional Integration and Resurgence of Traditional Political Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Social scientists have recently observed a ‘resurgence’ of traditional political institutions on the constitutional level in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the scope and causes of the resurgence remain

Does Title Increase Large Farm Productivity? Institutional Determinants of Large Land-Based Investments' Performance in Zambia

Despite accounts of increasing large farm penetration in Africa and an active debate on the differential potential of smallholder versus large farms to satisfy Africa’s food requirements, evidence on



Selected chiefs, elected councillors and hybrid democrats: popular perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority*

  • Carolyn Logan
  • Political Science
    The Journal of Modern African Studies
  • 2009
ABSTRACT The long-standing debate about the proper role for Africa's traditional leaders in contemporary politics has intensified in the last two decades, as efforts to foster democratisation and

Elections and Collective Action: Evidence from Changes in Traditional Institutions in Liberia

Numerous recent field and laboratory experiments find that elections cause higher subsequent levels of collective action within groups. This article questions whether effects observed in these novel

The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda.

It is shown that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers' natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.

What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana*

  • S. Lindberg
  • Political Science
    The Journal of Modern African Studies
  • 2010
ABSTRACT How African politicians, especially legislators, behave on a daily basis is still largely unknown. This article gives a unique empirical account of the daily accountability pressures and the

The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.

This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular

Traditional institutions and social cooperation: Experimental evidence from the Buganda Kingdom

Recent studies show that traditional institutions and their representatives—such as chiefs or elders—are influential political forces in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. In this paper, we explore

In the Gap the State Left: Policy Feedback, Collective Behavior, and Political Participation in Zambia

In advanced industrial democracies, evidence suggests a positive relationship between inclusive public policy, collective behavior, and political participation. Yet Africa, which generally exhibits

Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies

leaders, have been arrested several times, but always released. They are clearly part of the political scene, and in a pluralist political system can no longer be suppressed. Their existence and the

Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin

The author conducted a field experiment in Benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior. In collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections,

The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa

Part I. Toward a New Theory of Chiefs: 1. The paradox of chiefs 2. Conceptualizing chiefs 3. Traditional leaders and democracy 4. Chiefs as development brokers Part II. Chiefs, Development, and