Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance

@article{Roemer2001EgalitarianismAT,
  title={Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance},
  author={John E. Roemer},
  journal={Yale: Cowles Foundation Working Papers},
  year={2001}
}
  • J. Roemer
  • Published 1 September 2001
  • Economics, Philosophy
  • Yale: Cowles Foundation Working Papers
J. Rawls and R. Dworkin have each used veils of ignorance to justify equality (Rawls) or to compute what equality entails (Dworkin). J. Harsanyi has also derived a distributive ethic from a veil of ignorance argument, which, although not egalitarian, is believed by Harsanyi to be not excessively inegalitarian. Harsanyi's analysis does not determine a unique social choice function, but rather a family of such functions. Here, by appending more information to Harsanyi's environment, and an Axiom… 

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