Efficient priority rules

  title={Efficient priority rules},
  author={Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. JEL Classification: D63, D70 
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