• DOI:10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8
Corpus ID: 6976018

Efficient lottery design

@article{Kesten2017EfficientLD,
  title={Efficient lottery design},
  author={Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2017},
  volume={48},
  pages={31-57}
}

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, Alexander S. Nesterov

Published 2017

Economics, Computer Science

Social Choice and Welfare

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the… CONTINUE READING

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