Efficient fiscal spending by supranational unions

@inproceedings{Mattias2012EfficientFS,
  title={Efficient fiscal spending by supranational unions},
  author={Justin Mattias},
  year={2012}
}
  • Justin Mattias
  • Published 2012
Efficient Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions Jenny Simon, Justin Mattias Valasek* We use a novel approach to address the question of whether a union of sovereign countries can efficiently raise and allocate a budget, even when members are purely self-interested and participation is voluntary. The main innovation of our model is to explore the link between budget contributions and allocation that arises when countries bargain over union outcomes. This link stems from the distribution of… CONTINUE READING

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