Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization

@article{Nehring2007EfficientAS,
  title={Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization},
  author={K. Nehring and C. Puppe},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2007},
  volume={59},
  pages={132-153}
}
Abstract The paper provides a characterization of all efficient and strategy-proof voting mechanisms on a large class of preference domains, the class of all generalized single-peaked domains. It is shown that a strategy-proof voting mechanism on such a domain is efficient if and only if it satisfies a weak neutrality condition and is either almost dictatorial, or defined on a median space of dimension less than or equal to two. In more than two dimensions, weakly neutral voting mechanisms are… Expand

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