• Corpus ID: 235262752

Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments

@inproceedings{Yu2020EfficientAF,
  title={Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments},
  author={Jingsheng Yu and Jun Zhang},
  year={2020}
}
We propose a new method to define trading algorithms in market design environments. Dropping the traditional idea of clearing cycles in generated graphs, we use parameterized linear equations to define trading algorithms. Our method has two advantages. First, our method avoids discussing the details of who trades with whom and how, which can be a di ffi cult question in complex environments. Second, by controlling parameter values in our equations, our method is flexible and transparent to satisfy… 

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