Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading

@article{Myerson1983EfficientMF,
  title={Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading},
  author={Roger B. Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  year={1983},
  volume={29},
  pages={265-281}
}

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