Efficient Coordination Mechanisms for Unrelated Machine Scheduling

  title={Efficient Coordination Mechanisms for Unrelated Machine Scheduling},
  author={Ioannis Caragiannis},
We present three new coordination mechanisms for scheduling n selfish jobs on m unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy on each machine. The scheduling policies induce a game among the jobs and each job prefers to be scheduled on a machine so that its completion time is minimum given the assignments of the other jobs. We consider the maximum completion time among all jobs… CONTINUE READING
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