Efficiency of Simultaneous Search

  title={Efficiency of Simultaneous Search},
  author={Philipp Kircher},
This paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity. They observe firms’ wage postings before choosing where to apply. Owing to coordination frictions, a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. It is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient Walrasian outcome as application costs vanish. Even for nonnegligible… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 25 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.
20 Citations
28 References
Similar Papers


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 28 references

Alternative Theories of Wage Dispersion.

  • Gaumont, Damien, Martin Schindler, Randall Wright
  • European Econ. Rev
  • 2006

Essays in Equilibrium Search Theory.

  • Kircher, Philipp
  • PhD diss., Univ. Bonn
  • 2006

A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency.

  • Jackson, O Matthew
  • 2005

Directed Search on the Job and the Wage Ladder.

  • Delacroix, Alain, Shouyong Shi
  • Internat. Econ. Rev
  • 2004

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…