Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms

@article{Johari2009EfficiencyOS,
  title={Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms},
  author={Ramesh Johari and John N. Tsitsiklis},
  journal={Operations Research},
  year={2009},
  volume={57},
  pages={823-839}
}
We consider the problem of allocating a fixed amount of an infinitely divisible resource among multiple competing, fully rational users. We study the efficiency guarantees that are possible when we restrict to mechanisms that satisfy certain scalability constraints motivated by large scale communication networks; in particular, we restrict attention to mechanisms where users are restricted to one-dimensional strategy spaces. We first study the efficiency guarantees possible when the mechanism… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 121 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures, tables, results, connections, and topics extracted from this paper.
70 Extracted Citations
43 Extracted References
Similar Papers

Citing Papers

Publications influenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 70 extracted citations

121 Citations

01020'09'11'13'15'17
Citations per Year
Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 121 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.

Referenced Papers

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 43 references

An efficient mechanism for allocation of a divisible good and its application to network resource allocation Preprint

  • Bruce Hajek
  • 2004
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

The price of anarchy in supply chains : Quantifying the efficiency of price - only contracts Preprint . Roughgarden , Tim , Éva Tardos . 2002 . How bad is selfish routing ?

  • Sujay Sanghavi, Bruce Hajek
  • Journal of the ACM
  • 2006

The price of anarchy in supply chains: Quantifying the efficiency of price-only

  • G. 661–692. Roels, G. Perakis
  • 2006
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…