Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

@article{Chernomaz2012EfficiencyAS,
  title={Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study},
  author={Kirill Chernomaz and Dan Levin},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2012},
  volume={76},
  pages={611-635}
}
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C72 C91 D44 Keywords: Combinatorial auctions Package bidding Free-riding Asymmetric auctions Independent private value First-price auctions Experimental economics We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding… CONTINUE READING
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