Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance

@article{Booth2005EducationMA,
  title={Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance},
  author={Alison Booth and Melvyn G. Coles},
  journal={Legal Education eJournal},
  year={2005}
}
Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. These… 
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