Economies with Asymmetric Information and Individual Risk ∗

@inproceedings{Rustichini2003EconomiesWA,
  title={Economies with Asymmetric Information and Individual Risk ∗},
  author={Aldo Rustichini},
  year={2003}
}
In economies with asymmetric information agents have private information on economically relevant variables: on individual states (economies with private information), on the action taken (moral hazard), on their type (adverse selection). We analyze competitive equilibria of these economies in the tradition of Prescott and Townsend ([9]). It is known that economies with adverse selection behave differently from the others: we clarify how and why. Equilibria typically fail to exist for adverse… CONTINUE READING

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