Economic Power and the Firm in New Institutional Economics: Two Conflicting Problems

  title={Economic Power and the Firm in New Institutional Economics: Two Conflicting Problems},
  author={Giulio Palermo},
  journal={Journal of Economic Issues},
  pages={573 - 601}
  • G. Palermo
  • Published 1 September 2000
  • Economics
  • Journal of Economic Issues
The problem of the nature of the firm is at the origin of the research program of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The problem was first addressed by R. H. Coase [1937], who explored the reasons why authority and direction are economically superior to market relations. In my interpretation of NIE, starting with the contribution of Coase, research has developed along two distinct lines. In the former, Coase' s intuition has been developed by denying the existence of real authority relations… 
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