Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems

@article{Cusack2007EconomicIA,
  title={Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems},
  author={Thomas R. Cusack and Torben Iversen and D. Soskice},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2007},
  volume={101},
  pages={373 - 391}
}
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning… Expand
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