Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

@article{Feld2003EconomicGA,
  title={Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators},
  author={Lars P. Feld and S. Voigt},
  journal={CESifo Working Paper Series},
  year={2003}
}
Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians’ preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries’ actually experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57… Expand
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