Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power

@inproceedings{Baker2006EconomicEI,
  title={Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power},
  author={Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan},
  year={2006}
}
This paper addresses an important aspect of the interdisciplinary collaboration between law and economics: the use antitrust courts can and should make of empirical industrial organization economics, in light of the expansion of empirical knowledge generated during the last few decades. First we show how courts can apply what economists have learned about identification of alternative theories of industry structure and firm strategy to the problems of defining markets and determining whether… CONTINUE READING
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