Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace

  title={Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace},
  author={Stephen G. Brooks},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={863 - 888}
  • Stephen G. Brooks
  • Published 1 October 2013
  • Economics, Political Science
  • International Organization
Abstract Political scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic… 
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