author={Matthew C. Frise},
  journal={American Philosophical Quarterly},
  • M. Frise
  • Published 1 January 2018
  • Philosophy
  • American Philosophical Quarterly
The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is… 
Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified.
Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification
  • Jonathan Egeland
  • Philosophy
  • 2020
This article argues that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification, and presents a new scenario which functions as a counterexample to preservationism and provides intuitive support for accessinternalism.
Metacognition As Evidence for Evidentialism
Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the
Reliabilism’s Memory Loss
Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process
No need to know
I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I
Evidentialism, Time-Slice Mentalism, and Dreamless Sleep
I argue that the following theses are both popular among evidentialists but also jointly inconsistent with evidentialism: (1) Time-Slice Mentalism: one’s justificational properties at t are grounded