Dynamics of networking agents competing for high centrality and low degree.

  title={Dynamics of networking agents competing for high centrality and low degree.},
  author={Petter Holme and Gourab Ghoshal},
  journal={Physical review letters},
  volume={96 9},
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution, the success of the agents is related only to their position in the network. The agents use strategies based on local information to improve their chance of success. Both the evolution of strategies and network structure are investigated. We find a dramatic time… 

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