Dynamics of Open Source Movements

  title={Dynamics of Open Source Movements},
  author={Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison},
  journal={Organizations \& Markets: Policies \& Processes eJournal},
  • S. Athey, Glenn Ellison
  • Published 25 October 2010
  • Computer Science
  • Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes eJournal
This paper considers a dynamic model of the evolution of open source software projects, focusing on the evolution of quality, contributing programmers, and users who contribute customer support to other users. Programmers who have used open source software are motivated by reciprocal altruism to publish their own improvements. The evolution of the open-source project depends on the form of the altruistic benefits: in a base case the project grows to a steady-state size from any initial… 
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