Dynamics of Military Conflict: an Economics Perspective

  title={Dynamics of Military Conflict: an Economics Perspective},
  author={Klaus B. Beckmann and Lennart Reimer},
  journal={Review of Economics},
  pages={193 - 215}
Abstract This paper is concerned with methods for analysing patterns of conflict. We survey dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics, giving examples for each type of model. It turns out that computational requirements and theoretical difficulties impose tight limits on what can be achieved using the first two approaches. In particular, we appear to be forced to model… 
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