Dynamics for Infinite Dimensional Games

  title={Dynamics for Infinite Dimensional Games},
  author={Robert M. Seymour},
The explosion of interest amongst game-theorists in recent years in the ‘evolutionary’ (learning) dynamics of repeated games, has generally been concerned with 2-player (usually symmetric) games in which each player has available a finite number of pure strategies. The learning dynamics of players chosen from large, usually infinite, populations of such players, are then taken to describe the evolution of the probability with which a randomly chosen player will play a given pure strategy. In a… CONTINUE READING

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