Dynamic screening with limited commitment

@article{Deb2015DynamicSW,
  title={Dynamic screening with limited commitment},
  author={Rahul Deb and Maher Said},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2015},
  volume={159},
  pages={891-928}
}
We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and riskneutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of their values, and then privately learn the value realizations in period two. Buyers in the second cohort are “last-minute shoppers” that already know their values upon their arrival in period two. The… CONTINUE READING

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