Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market

@article{Ferreira2021DynamicPM,
  title={Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market},
  author={Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Daniel J. Moroz and David C. Parkes and Mitchell Stern},
  journal={Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies},
  year={2021}
}
In recent years, prominent blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have experienced explosive growth in transaction volume, leading to frequent surges in demand for limited block space and causing transaction fees to fluctuate by orders of magnitude. The status quo auctions sell space using a first-price auction [27]; however, users find it difficult to estimate how much they need to bid in order to get their transactions accepted onto the chain. If they bid too low, their transactions… 

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