Dynamic models of segregation

@article{Schelling1971DynamicMO,
  title={Dynamic models of segregation},
  author={Thomas C. Schelling},
  journal={Journal of Mathematical Sociology},
  year={1971},
  volume={1},
  pages={143-186}
}
  • T. Schelling
  • Published 1 July 1971
  • Economics
  • Journal of Mathematical Sociology
Some segregation results from the practices of organizations, some from specialized communication systems, some from correlation with a variable that is non‐random; and some results from the interplay of individual choices. This is an abstract study of the interactive dynamics of discriminatory individual choices. One model is a simulation in which individual members of two recognizable groups distribute themselves in neighborhoods defined by reference to their own locations. A second model is… 
Simulation Models of Group Segregation
This paper is concerned to illustrate a general theorem, that purely individual rational behaviour can produce aggregate social outcomes consistent with, perhaps even suggestive of, concerted
Segregation with Social Linkages: Evaluating Schelling's Model with Networked Individuals
This paper generalizes the original Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 2006) model of racial and residential segregation to a context of variable externalities due to social linkages. In a setting in which
Segregation in Urban Areas: A Literature Review
This literature review outlines research on how individual preferences can lead to segregation, even in the absence of discriminatory policy and other constraints. From Schelling’s (1971) Spatial
Dynamic Models of Residential Segregation: Brief Review - Analytical Resolution and Study of the Introduction of Coordination
TLDR
Schelling's model is recasted within the framework of evolutionary game theory, as previously done by Young (1998) ; Zhang (2004b), which allows to make sufficient assumptions regarding agents' utility functions that permit predicting the state of the system starting from any configuration.
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF PREFERENCES FOR SEGREGATION
Why might rational actors be interested in establishing a system of segregation, and under what structural conditions will this be more or less likely? To answer these questions, Coleman's `linear
The Schelling Model of Ethnic Residential Dynamics
The Schelling model of segregation is an agent-based model that illustrates how individual tendencies regarding neighbors can lead to segregation. The model is especially useful for the study of
Segregation and the Perception of the Minority
In his seminal work, Schelling (1971) shows that even individual preferences for integration across groups may generate high levels of segregation. However, this theoretical prediction does not match
Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation in Neighborhoods and Schools
In a classic paper, Schelling (1971) showed that extreme segregation can arise from social interactions in preferences: once the minority share in a neighborhood exceeds a "tipping point", all the
Tipping Points in Schelling Segregation
TLDR
A 1-dimensional unperturbed variant of Schelling's spacial proximity model is studied, which is additionally open in the sense that agents may enter and exit the model, along with independent values of the tolerance for each race.
Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation April 2007
In a classic paper, Schelling (1971) showed that extreme segregation can arise from social interactions in white preferences: once the minority share in a neighborhood exceeds a critical “tipping
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References

The Negro Ghetto: Problems and Alternatives
G HETTOS," as we must realistically term the segregated areas occupied by Negroes and other minority groups, are common features of American urban life. The vast majority of Negroes, Japanese, Puerto