• Corpus ID: 155100218

Dynamic model of firms competitive interaction on the market with taxation

  title={Dynamic model of firms competitive interaction on the market with taxation},
  author={O. A. Malafeyev and Eduard Abramyan and Andrey Shulga},
  journal={arXiv: General Finance},
In this article three models of firms interaction on the market are described. One of these models is described by using a differential equation and by Lotka-Volterra model, where the equation has a different form. Also, there are models of non-competing and competing firms. The article presents an algorithm for solving the interaction of competing firms in taxation and the calculation of a compromise point. Besides, the article presents a compromise between the interests of a state and an… 


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