Dynamic logic for belief revision

  title={Dynamic logic for belief revision},
  author={Johan van Benthem},
  journal={J. Appl. Non Class. Logics},
  • J. Benthem
  • Published 2007
  • Philosophy
  • J. Appl. Non Class. Logics
We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional… 

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