Dynamic learning and strategic communication

  title={Dynamic learning and strategic communication},
  author={Maxim Ivanov},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
This paper investigates a dynamic model of strategic communication between a principal and an expert with con‡icting preferences. In each stage, the uninformed principal can select the precision of expert’s information about an unknown state without observing the information itself. We show that the principal can elicit perfect information from the expert about the state and achieve the …rst-best outcome in two stages only if the expert’s preference bias is not too large. If the state space is… CONTINUE READING

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