• Corpus ID: 16358005

Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power

@article{Nunnari2018DynamicLB,
  title={Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power},
  author={Salvatore Nunnari},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2018}
}
In many domains, committees bargain over a sequence of policies and a policy remains in effect until a new agreement is reached. In this paper, I argue that, in order to assess the consequences of veto power, it is important to take into account this dynamic aspect. I analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that, irrespective of legislators' patience, the initial division of resources policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full… 
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The Power of the Agenda Setter : A Dynamic Legislative Bargaining Model ∗
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