Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

  title={Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure},
  author={Farzaneh Farhadi and Demosthenis Teneketzis},
  journal={ERN: Other Game Theory \& Bargaining Theory (Topic)},
We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that has two states, one "good" and one "bad" absorbing state, and has to decide how to sequentially disclose information to the detector. The detector's only information consists of the messages she receives from the principal. The detector's objective is to… 
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