Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability

  title={Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability},
  author={Noam Berger and Michal Feldman and Ofer Neiman and Mishael Rosenthal},
The price of anarchy [16] is by now a standard measure for quantifying the inefficiency introduced in games due to selfish behavior, and is defined as the ratio between the optimal outcome and the worst Nash equilibrium. However, this notion is well defined only for games that always possess a Nash equilibrium (NE). We propose the dynamic inefficiency measure, which is roughly defined as the average inefficiency in an infinite best-response dynamic. Both the price of anarchy [16] and the price… 
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  • Computer Science, Economics
  • 2018
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    The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings.
  • 2002
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