Dynamic Incentives for Congestion Control

@article{Barrera2015DynamicIF,
  title={Dynamic Incentives for Congestion Control},
  author={Jorge Barrera and Alfredo Garc{\'i}a},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
  year={2015},
  volume={60},
  pages={299-310}
}
We introduce a new dynamic pricing mechanism for controlling congestion in a network shared by non-cooperative users. The network exhibits a congestion externality and users have private information regarding their willingness to pay for network use. The externalities imply that many simple uniform price adjustment processes (e.g., tatonnement) either fail to effectively control flow demands and/or are subject to strategic manipulation. We propose a dynamic discriminatory pricing mechanism… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 28 CITATIONS

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…