Corpus ID: 199472551

Dynamic Competitive Persuasion

  title={Dynamic Competitive Persuasion},
  author={Mark Whitmeyer},
  journal={arXiv: Probability},
  • Mark Whitmeyer
  • Published 2018
  • Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics
  • arXiv: Probability
  • We examine a dynamic game of competitive persuasion played between two long-lived sellers over $T \leq \infty$ periods. Each period, each seller provides information via a Blackwell experiment to a single short-lived buyer, who buys from the seller whose product has the highest expected quality. We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and conduct comparative statics: in particular we find that long horizons lead to less information. 
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