Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics

  title={Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics},
  author={Brian Skyrms},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={1 - 20}
  • B. Skyrms
  • Published 1 March 1987
  • Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Science
The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status. 
Several theorems on the asymptotic behavior of subjective probabilities are proven and show that while a consensus nearly always emerges in important special cases, sustained rational disagreement can be expected in many other situations. Expand
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This includes some other virtues, in addition to dynamic coherence
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