Dynamic Budget Throttling in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

  title={Dynamic Budget Throttling in Repeated Second-Price Auctions},
  author={Zhaohua Chen and Chang Wang and Qian Wang and Yuqi Pan and Z. Shi and Chuyue Tang and Zheng Cai and Yukun Ren and Zhihua Zhu and Xiaotie Deng},
Throttling is one of the most popular budget control methods in today’s online advertising markets. When a budget-constrained advertiser employs throttling, she can choose whether to participate in an auction or not after the advertising platform recommends a bid. This paper focuses on the dynamic budget throttling process in repeated second-price auctions from a theoretical view. An essential feature of the underlying problem is that the advertiser does not know the distribution of the highest… 

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