Dynamic Auction: A Tractable Auction Procedure

  title={Dynamic Auction: A Tractable Auction Procedure},
  author={Dongmo Zhang and Laurent Perrussel},
Dynamic auctions are trading mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices and efficient allocations based on price adjustment processes. This paper studies the computational issues of dynamic auctions for selling multiple indivisible items. Although the decision problem of efficient allocations in a dynamic auction in general is intractable, it can be solved in polynomial time if the economy under consideration satisfies the condition of Gross Substitutes and Complements, which is known as… CONTINUE READING

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