Corpus ID: 146700339

Dworkin's Two Principles of Dignity: An Unsatisfactory Nonconsequentialist Account of Interpersonal Moral Duties

@article{Simons2010DworkinsTP,
  title={Dworkin's Two Principles of Dignity: An Unsatisfactory Nonconsequentialist Account of Interpersonal Moral Duties},
  author={Kenneth W Simons},
  journal={Boston University Law Review},
  year={2010},
  volume={90},
  pages={715}
}
  • K. Simons
  • Published 6 May 2010
  • Sociology
  • Boston University Law Review
In his ambitious and wide-ranging new book, Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin offers an alternative to consequentialist theories of law, political morality, moral duties, and personal ethics. Respect for human dignity, he says, entails two requirements: self-respect, i.e., taking the objective importance of your own life seriously; and authenticity, i.e., accepting a personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success in your own life. For Dworkin, these two principles of dignity… Expand
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