Duopoly game of callable products in airline revenue management

@article{Li2016DuopolyGO,
  title={Duopoly game of callable products in airline revenue management},
  author={Tingting Li and Jinxing Xie and Sheng-Min Lu and Jiafu Tang},
  journal={European Journal of Operational Research},
  year={2016},
  volume={254},
  pages={925-934}
}
This paper studies the capacity allocation game between duopolistic airlines which could offer callable products. Previous literature has shown that callable products provide a riskless source of additional revenue for a monopolistic airline. We examine the impact of the introduction of callable products on the revenues and the booking limits of duopolistic airlines. The analytical results demonstrate that, when there is no spill of low-fare customers, offering callable products is a dominant… CONTINUE READING

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