Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition.

  title={Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition.},
  author={Jonathan Evans},
  journal={Annual review of psychology},
  • Jonathan Evans
  • Published 8 January 2008
  • Psychology
  • Annual review of psychology
This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process… 

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