Corpus ID: 16914941

Dual-Stock Structure , Analyst Following , and Corporate Governance

  title={Dual-Stock Structure , Analyst Following , and Corporate Governance},
  author={Hoje Jo and Young Hyung Kim},
We examine the effects of internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the dual-class status and the firm value of dual-class firms. Employing 736 dual-class firms and 7,027 single-class firms during the period 1996-2002, we find that dual-class firms tend to be larger, and have higher director ownership, higher institutional ownership, lower blockholdings, and a smaller fraction of independent directors on their boards than single-class firms. In addition, we observe… Expand

Figures and Tables from this paper


Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features.Expand
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Corporate-governance provisions related to takeover defenses and shareholder rights vary substantially across firms. In this paper, we use the incidence of 24 different provisions to build aExpand
Corporate Governance, Analyst Following, and Firm Behavior
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the finance literature has studied the role of institutions, boards, the takeover market and CEO compensation for mitigating agency costs. This paper examines theExpand
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?
Using proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms during 1994-2000, we establish that, in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily firms, one mustExpand
Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies
Using a sample of U.S. dual-class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as thisExpand
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeoverExpand
The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis
Many theories have been proposed to explain how corporate boards are structured. This paper groups these theories into three hypotheses and tests them empirically. We utilize a unique panel datasetExpand
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
We investigate which provisions, among a set of twenty-four governance provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), are correlated with firm value and stockholderExpand
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
Abstract We investigate the relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986. We find a significant curvilinear relationExpand
Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards
This paper models the interaction of firm insiders and outsiders on a corporate board and addresses the question of the board's ideal size and composition. In the model, the board is responsible forExpand