Corpus ID: 16914941

Dual-Stock Structure , Analyst Following , and Corporate Governance

@inproceedings{Jo2010DualStockS,
  title={Dual-Stock Structure , Analyst Following , and Corporate Governance},
  author={H. Jo and Y. Kim},
  year={2010}
}
  • H. Jo, Y. Kim
  • Published 2010
  • We examine the effects of internal and external corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms on the dual-class status and the firm value of dual-class firms. Employing 736 dual-class firms and 7,027 single-class firms during the period 1996-2002, we find that dual-class firms tend to be larger, and have higher director ownership, higher institutional ownership, lower blockholdings, and a smaller fraction of independent directors on their boards than single-class firms. In addition, we observe… CONTINUE READING

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