Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth

@article{Drake2016DoxasticPA,
  title={Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth},
  author={J. Drake},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2016},
  volume={194},
  pages={4897-4912}
}
  • J. Drake
  • Published 2016
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Synthese
The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with respect to whether… Expand
8 Citations

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