• DOI:10.1093/ISQ/SQAA081
• Corpus ID: 236246828

Doubling Down: The Danger of Disclosing Secret Action

@article{Otto2020DoublingDT,
  title={Doubling Down: The Danger of Disclosing Secret Action},
  author={Jacob Otto and William Spaniel},
  journal={International Studies Quarterly},
  year={2020},
  volume={65},
  pages={500-511}
}

• Jacob Otto, William Spaniel
• Published 8 June 2021
• Economics
• International Studies Quarterly

When an actor catches a state taking an objectionable secret action, it faces a dilemma. Exposing the action could force unresolved states to terminate the behavior to save face. But it could also provoke resolved states to double down on the activity now that others are aware of the infraction. We develop a model that captures this fundamental tradeoff. Three main results emerge. First, the state and its opponent may engage in a form of collusion—opponents do not expose resolved states despite their distaste for the behavior. Second, when faced with uncertainty, the opponent may mistakenly expose a resolved type and induce escalation, leading the opponent to have ex post regret. Finally, as the strength of secret action increases, states may engage in it less often. This counterintuitive result is a consequence of the opponent’s greater willingness to expose, which deters less resolved types. ∗Forthcoming at International Studies Quarterly. We would like to thank Austin Carson, Andrew Little, Michael Poznansky, Rochelle Terman, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. †PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. ‡Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. ([e-mail], http://williamspaniel.com).