Doubling Down: The Danger of Disclosing Secret Action

  title={Doubling Down: The Danger of Disclosing Secret Action},
  author={Jacob Otto and William Spaniel},
  journal={International Studies Quarterly},
When an actor catches a state taking an objectionable secret action, it faces a dilemma. Exposing the action could force unresolved states to terminate the behavior to save face. But it could also provoke resolved states to double down on the activity now that others are aware of the infraction. We develop a model that captures this fundamental tradeoff. Three main results emerge. First, the state and its opponent may engage in a form of collusion—opponents do not expose resolved states despite… 
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